feat(captcha): HMAC-signed stateless challenge + verification tokens

This commit is contained in:
Alex Dunmow 2026-07-03 17:13:24 +08:00
parent 84723991cd
commit f5cbb56df7
2 changed files with 144 additions and 0 deletions

96
captcha/tokens.go Normal file
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package captcha
import (
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
// nowMs is a seam so tests can control time. Millisecond epoch to match the
// reference (JS Date.now()).
var nowMs = func() int64 { return time.Now().UnixMilli() }
type challengeClaims struct {
Nonce string
ExpiresMs int64
C, S, D int
}
func sign(secret []byte, payload string) string {
m := hmac.New(sha256.New, secret)
m.Write([]byte(payload))
return hex.EncodeToString(m.Sum(nil))
}
// makeChallengeToken encodes challenge params as "nonce:expires:c:s:d:hmac".
func makeChallengeToken(secret []byte, nonce string, expiresMs int64, c, s, d int) string {
payload := nonce + ":" + strconv.FormatInt(expiresMs, 10) + ":" +
strconv.Itoa(c) + ":" + strconv.Itoa(s) + ":" + strconv.Itoa(d)
return payload + ":" + sign(secret, payload)
}
func verifyChallengeToken(secret []byte, token string) *challengeClaims {
if token == "" {
return nil
}
i := strings.LastIndex(token, ":")
if i < 0 {
return nil
}
payload, sig := token[:i], token[i+1:]
if !hmac.Equal([]byte(sig), []byte(sign(secret, payload))) {
return nil
}
f := strings.Split(payload, ":")
if len(f) != 5 {
return nil
}
expires, err1 := strconv.ParseInt(f[1], 10, 64)
c, err2 := strconv.Atoi(f[2])
s, err3 := strconv.Atoi(f[3])
d, err4 := strconv.Atoi(f[4])
if err1 != nil || err2 != nil || err3 != nil || err4 != nil {
return nil
}
if expires <= nowMs() {
return nil
}
return &challengeClaims{Nonce: f[0], ExpiresMs: expires, C: c, S: s, D: d}
}
// makeVerificationToken creates "random:expires:hmac".
func makeVerificationToken(secret []byte, expiresMs int64) (string, error) {
buf := make([]byte, 15)
if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil {
return "", err
}
payload := hex.EncodeToString(buf) + ":" + strconv.FormatInt(expiresMs, 10)
return payload + ":" + sign(secret, payload), nil
}
func verifyVerificationToken(secret []byte, token string) bool {
if token == "" {
return false
}
i := strings.LastIndex(token, ":")
if i < 0 {
return false
}
payload, sig := token[:i], token[i+1:]
if !hmac.Equal([]byte(sig), []byte(sign(secret, payload))) {
return false
}
f := strings.Split(payload, ":")
if len(f) != 2 {
return false
}
expires, err := strconv.ParseInt(f[1], 10, 64)
if err != nil {
return false
}
return expires > nowMs()
}

48
captcha/tokens_test.go Normal file
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package captcha
import "testing"
func TestChallengeTokenRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
secret := []byte("s3cr3t")
tok := makeChallengeToken(secret, "abc123", nowMs()+60_000, 50, 32, 4)
claims := verifyChallengeToken(secret, tok)
if claims == nil {
t.Fatal("valid token rejected")
}
if claims.Nonce != "abc123" || claims.C != 50 || claims.S != 32 || claims.D != 4 {
t.Fatalf("bad claims: %+v", claims)
}
}
func TestChallengeTokenTamperAndExpiry(t *testing.T) {
secret := []byte("s3cr3t")
tok := makeChallengeToken(secret, "abc123", nowMs()+60_000, 50, 32, 4)
if verifyChallengeToken([]byte("wrong"), tok) != nil {
t.Error("token accepted under wrong secret")
}
if verifyChallengeToken(secret, tok+"x") != nil {
t.Error("tampered token accepted")
}
expired := makeChallengeToken(secret, "abc123", nowMs()-1, 50, 32, 4)
if verifyChallengeToken(secret, expired) != nil {
t.Error("expired token accepted")
}
}
func TestVerificationToken(t *testing.T) {
secret := []byte("s3cr3t")
vt, err := makeVerificationToken(secret, nowMs()+60_000)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !verifyVerificationToken(secret, vt) {
t.Error("valid verification token rejected")
}
if verifyVerificationToken([]byte("wrong"), vt) {
t.Error("verification token accepted under wrong secret")
}
expired, _ := makeVerificationToken(secret, nowMs()-1)
if verifyVerificationToken(secret, expired) {
t.Error("expired verification token accepted")
}
}