diff --git a/captcha/captcha.go b/captcha/captcha.go
index baf2c47..04b8650 100644
--- a/captcha/captcha.go
+++ b/captcha/captcha.go
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ type Server struct {
 	challengeTTL   time.Duration
 	tokenTTL       time.Duration
 	nonces         NonceStore
+	usedTokens     NonceStore
 }
 
 type Option func(*Server)
@@ -50,6 +51,10 @@ func WithChallengeExpiry(d time.Duration) Option { return func(sv *Server) { sv.
 func WithTokenExpiry(d time.Duration) Option     { return func(sv *Server) { sv.tokenTTL = d } }
 func WithNonceStore(ns NonceStore) Option        { return func(sv *Server) { sv.nonces = ns } }
 
+// WithUsedTokenStore injects the single-use store for redemption tokens
+// (mirrors WithNonceStore; a durable cross-process store can implement it later).
+func WithUsedTokenStore(ns NonceStore) Option { return func(sv *Server) { sv.usedTokens = ns } }
+
 // New builds a Server. Defaults match the Cap.js reference: 50 sub-challenges,
 // 32-char salts, difficulty 4, 10-min challenge / 5-min token expiry.
 func New(secret []byte, opts ...Option) *Server {
@@ -61,6 +66,7 @@ func New(secret []byte, opts ...Option) *Server {
 		challengeTTL: 10 * time.Minute,
 		tokenTTL:     5 * time.Minute,
 		nonces:       NewMemoryNonceStore(),
+		usedTokens:   NewMemoryNonceStore(),
 	}
 	for _, o := range opts {
 		o(s)
@@ -112,8 +118,27 @@ func (s *Server) Redeem(token string, solutions []string) RedeemResponse {
 	return RedeemResponse{Success: true, Token: vt, Expires: expires}
 }
 
+// VerifyToken validates a redemption token and consumes it: a token is
+// SINGLE-USE and cannot be replayed within its TTL. The token is burned only on
+// a successful verification (valid HMAC + unexpired + not previously used);
+// forged/expired tokens never touch the store.
+//
+// Burn semantics — IMPORTANT for callers: consumption happens here, at the
+// captcha layer, BEFORE any downstream business logic runs. So if a caller
+// verifies the captcha and THEN rejects the request for a non-captcha reason
+// (wrong password, invalid email, form validation error), the token is already
+// spent. This is deliberate: it closes the replay window. The Cap widget
+// re-issues a fresh token on its next solve, so a re-rendered form/error
+// fragment that still carries the widget (with its reset flow) lets the visitor
+// re-solve and retry — callers MUST keep the widget present on rejection paths.
 func (s *Server) VerifyToken(token string) bool {
-	return verifyVerificationToken(s.secret, token)
+	claims := parseVerificationToken(s.secret, token)
+	if claims == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	ttl := max(time.Duration(claims.ExpiresMs-nowMs())*time.Millisecond, 0)
+	// MarkUsed returns false if this token id was already consumed → replay.
+	return s.usedTokens.MarkUsed(claims.ID, ttl)
 }
 
 // VerifyRequest reads the cap-token form field and verifies it. Callers that
diff --git a/captcha/captcha_test.go b/captcha/captcha_test.go
index 4aecb95..2526255 100644
--- a/captcha/captcha_test.go
+++ b/captcha/captcha_test.go
@@ -42,6 +42,40 @@ func TestChallengeRedeemRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestVerifyTokenSingleUse(t *testing.T) {
+	s := New([]byte("secret"), WithChallenge(5, 8, 2))
+	cr, _ := s.CreateChallenge()
+	res := s.Redeem(cr.Token, solve(cr.Token, cr.Challenge))
+	if !res.Success {
+		t.Fatal("valid redeem rejected")
+	}
+	// First verification succeeds.
+	if !s.VerifyToken(res.Token) {
+		t.Fatal("first VerifyToken should succeed")
+	}
+	// Replaying the same token within its TTL must fail — single-use.
+	if s.VerifyToken(res.Token) {
+		t.Error("replayed verification token accepted (should be single-use)")
+	}
+	// A third replay stays rejected.
+	if s.VerifyToken(res.Token) {
+		t.Error("second replay of verification token accepted")
+	}
+	// A forged/garbage token never consumes and never verifies.
+	if s.VerifyToken("not-a-real-token") {
+		t.Error("garbage token accepted")
+	}
+	// An independently issued token is unaffected by another token's burn.
+	cr2, _ := s.CreateChallenge()
+	res2 := s.Redeem(cr2.Token, solve(cr2.Token, cr2.Challenge))
+	if !res2.Success {
+		t.Fatal("second redeem rejected")
+	}
+	if !s.VerifyToken(res2.Token) {
+		t.Error("fresh independent token rejected after another token was burned")
+	}
+}
+
 func TestRedeemRejects(t *testing.T) {
 	s := New([]byte("secret"), WithChallenge(5, 8, 2))
 	cr, _ := s.CreateChallenge()
diff --git a/captcha/tokens.go b/captcha/tokens.go
index fb6150a..3cd524f 100644
--- a/captcha/tokens.go
+++ b/captcha/tokens.go
@@ -72,25 +72,44 @@ func makeVerificationToken(secret []byte, expiresMs int64) (string, error) {
 	return payload + ":" + sign(secret, payload), nil
 }
 
-func verifyVerificationToken(secret []byte, token string) bool {
+// verificationClaims is the parsed, cryptographically-verified content of a
+// redemption token. ID is the random per-token identifier (unique per Redeem),
+// used as the single-use key in the used-token store.
+type verificationClaims struct {
+	ID        string
+	ExpiresMs int64
+}
+
+// parseVerificationToken validates the HMAC + expiry and returns the claims, or
+// nil if the token is empty, malformed, forged, or expired. This is a purely
+// stateless check — it does NOT consume the token (see Server.VerifyToken for
+// the single-use burn).
+func parseVerificationToken(secret []byte, token string) *verificationClaims {
 	if token == "" {
-		return false
+		return nil
 	}
 	i := strings.LastIndex(token, ":")
 	if i < 0 {
-		return false
+		return nil
 	}
 	payload, sig := token[:i], token[i+1:]
 	if !hmac.Equal([]byte(sig), []byte(sign(secret, payload))) {
-		return false
+		return nil
 	}
 	f := strings.Split(payload, ":")
 	if len(f) != 2 {
-		return false
+		return nil
 	}
 	expires, err := strconv.ParseInt(f[1], 10, 64)
 	if err != nil {
-		return false
+		return nil
 	}
-	return expires > nowMs()
+	if expires <= nowMs() {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return &verificationClaims{ID: f[0], ExpiresMs: expires}
+}
+
+func verifyVerificationToken(secret []byte, token string) bool {
+	return parseVerificationToken(secret, token) != nil
 }